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The European response to the challenge of the Japanese steel 
industry (1950–1980)
Pablo Díaz-Morlán and Miguel Sáez-García
Department of Applied economic Analysis, university of Alicante, Alicante, spain
During the three and a half decades following the Second World War, the world steel industry 
experienced unprecedented growth together with structural changes in the overall way that 
steel was produced. In the integrated steel industry, which accounted for the majority of total 
steel production, a series of successful interrelated innovations gave rise to a huge increase 
in productivity.1 The most relevant included the transfer of the factories to the coast, the 
fall in freight rates, the discovery of enormous deposits of raw materials, the improvements 
made in the blast furnace process, the substitution of the open-hearth furnaces with oxygen 
converters and, subsequently, the adoption of continuous casting. The leading role played 
by Japan in this paradigm shift has been extensively studied by different authors. They have 
partly attributed Japan’s success to the specific circumstances of the nation after its defeat 
in the Second World War and the North American imposition of the market economy and 
its opening up to international trade. Other factors contributing to Japan’s success were 
the sustained increase in domestic demand, the government’s support of industrialisation 
and exports through the Ministry of International Trade and Industry (MITI), the business 
initiative, the qualifications and working spirit of its labour force and last but not least, the 
investment effort which gave a huge boost to innovation.2
This article has two objectives: first, to study the response of the European authorities, 
specifically the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) to the Japanese challenge. The 
ABSTRACT
Between 1950 and 1980, the European delay with respect to Japan 
and the relative loss of competitiveness in the integrated steel 
industry was due to an institutional, geographical and economic logic 
based largely on historical factors. Europe had a long steel-making 
history that was closely related to its sources of raw materials. The 
new technological paradigm turned this former advantage into a 
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documents drawn from the ECSC archives in the European University Institute of Florence 
reveal that the European authorities were highly
concerned about the emergence of the new Asian power and provide a relatively 
unknown perspective of the Japanese reality, confirming the claims of some authors: the 
independence of the steel companies with respect to government directives in the 1960s 
and the ineffectiveness of the state in imposing its decisions on the sector.3 This would render 
the efforts of the ECSC to reach an agreement with Japan useless.4 The second objective is to 
compare some of Japan’s success factors with the circumstances prevailing in the European 
steel industry to gain a better understanding of the reasons why Europe was not at the 
forefront of the transformation, but merely adapting to the changes, pushed by the threat 
of a new uncomfortable competitor that, in a short period of time, had become able to offer 
steel of a similar quality at a lower price to world markets. Between 1950 and 1980, Japan 
had become more competitive than Europe and took its place as the leader of domestic 
and foreign markets. Europe had to respond by recurring to the support of public finance. 
Japan innovated and Europe was obliged to adapt to this innovation, managing to close the 
technological gap in the 1970s that had opened in the previous decade.
The article is structured in the following way. The first section contemplates the emer-
gence of Japan as a new world steel power and the production and organisational innova-
tions that made this possible, two of which are particularly significant: the transfer to the 
coast and the Linz-Donawitz (LD) converter or Basic Oxygen Furnace (BOF). The second 
section studies the initial European response to the Japanese challenge in the 1960s. The 
third part analyses Europe’s late adaptation to the Japanese innovations in order to close the 
technological gap that had arisen. The conclusion addresses the differences in the factors 
that influenced the capacity to innovate of the two world regions and a final interpretation 
regarding the role played by the ECSC in some of these factors.
1. The emergence of the Japanese problem in the world steel industry
After its defeat in the Second World War, Japan was subjected to the administrative pattern 
of the US which imposed a new, more democratic political and economic structure that was 
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Figure 1. Japan vs. europe. steel production (1946–1980) (million tonnes of crude steel). sources: Ceab 
8/610, 831, and 1530; Federal trade Commission, United States steel; World steel Association, Statistics 
archive. http://www.worldsteel.org/statistics/statistics-archive.html.
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less corporate and more open to the rest of the world. After the difficult post-war years, the 
Korean war at the beginning of the 1950s represented the first major opportunity for the 
resurgence of Japanese industry, due both to the North American decision to convert Japan 
into its ally in the Cold War and the possibility of benefitting from the increase in demand 
for its products as a result of a war nearby. From this point, the ambitious industrial plans 
of the MITI assigned the steel industry a leading role due to its relevance as a supplier to 
other industries and as a sector capable of increasing exports and therefore earning foreign 
currency that was essential for recovery. The large Japanese steel-making companies were 
soon able to increase their production, expand their markets and compete on a global level 
with the traditional steel producers. As Figure 1 illustrates, from a modest beginning, Japan 
became one of the world’s leading steel producers with a level of output that was very close 
to European production. At the beginning of the 1970s its crude steel production surpassed 
one hundred million tonnes after a period of explosive growth during the previous decade. 
Its production exceeded that of France in 1959, of the UK in 1961 and Germany in 1964. For 
the whole period between 1950 and 1980 the average annual variation rate of crude steel 
production was 4.5% for the whole world, 3.3% for Western Europe and 11% for Japan. 
Consequently, Japan’s share of the world steel industry grew from 9% in 1960 to 24% in 1980, 
while Western Europe’s share dropped from 45% to 35% in the same period.5
The majority of this production remained in the domestic market in order to supply the car 
factories, shipyards and other sectors that demanded steel. The increase in steel production 
responded to the growth of internal demand: during the 1950s, while in Japan the appar-
ent consumption of steel grew at an annual rate of 17.3%, in the ECSC countries it grew at 
a rate of 8.3% and in the UK by 3.3%; in the 1960s, the growth rates were 13.1%, 5.6% and 
2.5% respectively. Between 1955 and 1974 (the year before the major crisis in the sector), the 
apparent consumption of crude steel multiplied by 10.5 in Japan, by 2.4 in the ECSC countries 
and by 1.23 in the UK.6 This was the era in which steel was known as the rice of industry due 
to its importance as an input in Japanese industrial production. However, an increasing per-
centage of the country’s steel output was exported to markets which, until then, had been 
supplied by North American and European companies. In 1955, Japan’s share of world steel 
exports accounted for 6.6%. In 1973, this share had risen to 28.6%, making it the world’s larg-
est exporter.7 The countries affected by the emergence of Japan did not take long to react. In 
1959, the US shifted from being a net exporter to a net importer of steel and its steel imports 
continued to rise during the following decade. In 1968, Japan exported seven million tonnes 
to the profitable North American market.8 In response, the US imposed the Voluntary Restraint 
Agreements (VRA) that temporarily slowed the growth of imports.9 The crisis of the 1970s and 
the resurgence of Japanese sales gave rise to accusations of dumping, lobbying practices by 
the affected steel companies demanding protection and allegations of Non Tariff Barriers (NTB), 
which supposedly obstructed the access of Western companies to the domestic Japanese mar-
ket.10 In Europe, however, the Japanese problem had different connotations than in the US. The 
concern of the UK and the ECSC countries was not caused by Japan’s sudden gain of market 
share in the domestic market. It was due to the growing competitiveness of Japanese steel in 
foreign markets that traditionally purchased from Europe. Steel formed part of a general trend 
in the economic relations between Europe and Japan which included several other sectors such 
as the car industry or shipbuilding, characterised by its qualified workforce, high value added 
and capital intensive production. After its rapid industrialisation process, Japan was no longer 
a complementary player alongside Europe in world markets; they were now competitors.11
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However, despite the complaints of the countries affected by the emergence of the new 
competitor and the allegations of dumping, the Japanese success in steel markets was due 
to its ability to offer high quality products at lower prices than its traditional competitors. 
These attractive prices were possible thanks to the relative fall in production costs. This is 
the conclusion reached by the Federal Trade Commission in 1977 in an exhaustive report 
for the US government analysing five possible causes of the behaviour of the steel market 
during the 20 preceding years. After contemplating the subsidies granted in the different 
countries, low profits, possible price manipulation by companies, government price control 
and production costs, it concluded that the only valid explanation was the latter.12 In 1958, 
before the innovations, the total operating costs of a tonne of cold rolled sheet were 128 
dollars for Japan and 114 for the US. Japan had an advantage of 22 dollars in labour costs 
(21 as opposed to 43 in the US), but it paid a lot more for materials (107 as opposed to 71 
in the US). Coal cost 84% more, iron 38% more and scrap 27% more. The key to becoming 
competitive resided in reducing the prices of these materials or their consumption. The 
Japanese did both. They reduced the price of iron and coal by transferring the steel industry 
to the coast. They lowered the consumption of coal by improving the blast furnaces and the 
consumption of scrap by adopting the BOF. While the costs of iron ore practically remained 
stable during the following two decades, in Europe they almost doubled. In 1980, the iron 
ore that was sent from Australia to Japan was cheaper than that consumed by the American 
and European factories.13 Moreover, the Japanese advantage with respect to labour costs 
in 1950 was due to the very low wages rather than productivity: wages were the equiva-
lent of one sixth of American wages but a worker in the US produced triple the amount of 
a Japanese worker. This also changed with the strong capital investments: between 1956 
and 1976, Japanese labour costs per tonne produced increased by only 35% compared to 
the 265% in the US. In short, Japan saved mainly in the price of iron ore, the consumption 
of scrap and labour costs and almost matched America in the cost of coal. As a result, the 
total steel costs in Japan increased by 70% while in the US they were multiplied by 2.4 and 
in Europe they tripled.14
The relative improvement in the costs of producing steel in Japan was the result of adopt-
ing a series of innovations which gradually increased the levels of productivity in Japanese 
factories. It constituted a new technological paradigm which would permanently change 
the way steel was produced in integrated steel plants throughout the world. This new par-
adigm was formed by a constellation of innovations that affected all the stages of the steel 
production process, including the acquisition, reception and processing of raw materials, 
their melting in blast furnaces, their subsequent conversion into steel, rolling and finally 
sale and transport to the different markets. Although it is impossible to address all of these 
innovations in this article, it is worth highlighting two of them due to their capacity, by 
themselves, to alter the whole production process. These two innovations were: first, the 
construction of greenfield steelplants on the coast instead of close to the raw material extrac-
tion sites usually located inland; second, the substitution of old Thomas steel converters 
(Basic Bessemer) and Martin steel converters Open Hearth Furnaces (OHF) with new oxygen 
converters (LDs or BOFs).
Transferring the integrated steel plants to the coast was the result of a decision taken in 
1950 by yataro Nishiyama, the president of Kawasaki Steel Co., then a small non-integrated 
company detached from its zaibatsu by order of the US government. Nishiyama ignored the 
recommendations of the MITI to carry out a prudent renovation of the facilities and decided 
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to revive an old and ambitious expansion project which did not have the support of the 
government or the leading Japanese steel companies. This plan consisted in increasing the 
production capacity of the company through the construction of new integrated facilities in 
Chiba, in Tokyo Bay. One of Nishiyama’s primary objectives was to ensure the production of 
pig iron through the construction of his own blast furnaces, given the difficulty of acquiring 
it during the post-war period. To do this he needed to import iron ore and coal. The Japanese 
steel sector had accumulated a long list of problems after the Second World War, including 
the elimination of the zaibatsus and military industry by the US, the loss of its colonies and 
consequently the traditional supply of carbon and iron ore, the difficulty in acquiring scrap 
at a reasonable price and the prohibition of the tariff barriers policies and subsidies. It was 
even believed that the best option was for Japan to do away with its own steel industry, 
import the steel that it needed and to specialise in light industry. However, there was another 
option which was the one that Nishiyama implemented with his Chiba Works: transforming 
the industry and preparing it to compete in international markets. All initiatives had to focus 
on innovation if the Japanese steel industry wanted to survive.15
The leading steel companies followed Kawasaki’s model and designed projects for new 
plants on the coast. From 1955, world demand gave rise to more ambitious projects that 
rendered those of 1950 obsolete. Five more greenfields on the coast adding to the pioneering 
Chiba Works were announced for 1960. The large size of the new factories, their location on 
the coast, the radical reduction in transport costs thanks to the increased size of the new 
vessels and the discovery of enormous coal and iron ore mines in different parts of the world, 
particularly Australia and South America, made the Japanese steel revolution possible.16 The 
costs of shipping coal and iron ore fell by 70% between 1957 and 1969.17 The large capital 
investment in the new plants and processes resulted in a significant increase in the minimum 
efficient scale (MES). The annual production capacity of each blast furnace increased to three 
million and that of each converter to three or four million, and to avoid complications that 
would hinder production, both installations were duplicated. Therefore the MES grew from 
between 1 and 2.5 million in the 1950s to 6–7 million in the 1970s, making the most of the 
economies of scale of the integrated steel industry.18 In 1965, with their greenfields and 
their BOFs in full operation, the six leading steel companies in Japan (yawata, Fuji, Kokan, 
Kawasaki, Sumitomo and Kobe), held a 73% share of the domestic market.19 In 1975, sixteen 
coastal steelworks produced 82% of Japanese steel whereas only 10% of production was 
manufactured by coastal steelworks in the US and 24% in Europe.20
In the spring of 1963, a large group of representatives of the British steel industry visited 
the facilities of the six largest Japanese steel companies and several research centres. In 
their special report of the trip they analysed all of the technical aspects that had enabled the 
Japanese steel industry to become the most efficient in the world. They concluded that as 
well as automation, the more efficient use of gases and the larger size of the blast furnaces, 
the main advantage of the Japanese steelworks was their location on the coast. This had 
enabled them to bring down the cost of importing raw materials and greatly reduced the 
cost of internal transport. The British representatives reported that between 1951 and 1962 
the amount invested in the steel industry had been similar in Britain and Japan, around 4 
billion dollars, but while the British had used it to renovate the existing facilities, the Japanese 
had invested in constructing new coastal steelworks while reducing costs to a minimum. 
Until 1959, the ports could receive vessels of 18,000 tonnes (33 feet deep). The Ministry of 
Transport and the steel industry jointly developed and financed a drainage programme 
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which increased the depth (39 feet) of the ports so that they were able to receive vessels 
of 40,000 tonnes. In 1964–65 a new programme was implemented to further increase the 
capacity of the ports to accommodate vessels of 80,000 tons (49 feet). The steel companies 
together with the shipyards built new larger vessels to ship the iron ore from South America 
and Africa. With 15-year-long contracts, Japan brought the iron ore that it needed from 
Malaysia, India, Chile and Peru, the coal from the US and Australia and the scrap also from 
the USA.21 A year after the British report, the Bulletin Quotidien of the ECSC also referred to 
the advantages of the coastal steelworks adding that thanks to all the innovations, the need 
for coke per tonne of pig iron in Japan had fallen from 840 kg in 1953 to 520 kg in 1963, and 
concluded that the accusations of dumping were false and that the increase in Japanese 
exports were due to the increase in its competitiveness.22
The first steps taken in implementing the oxygen converter were slow and began at 
around the same time as the transfer of the large Japanese steelworks to the coast after 
Kawasaki had demonstrated the success of this strategy. The main advantage of the new 
converter was that it drastically reduced the consumption of scrap needed by the open 
hearth converter, which was interesting for all those countries and companies that had 
difficulties in acquiring this raw material. But in the early days this new converter also had 
some weaknesses that raised doubts as to its feasibility until they were resolved by the 
improvements introduced by those first to adopt it. After recovering the patents issued prior 
to the Second World War, in 1952 the first two BOFs were built in Austria. Five years later, 
there were only four in the world, although another six had been commissioned; some by 
yawata and Nippon Kokan of Japan. The problems of the new oxygen converter were that 
it was highly contaminating and that its bricks had to be repaired frequently so it was bet-
ter to have two to ensure that at least one was working. Furthermore, until the mid 1960s, 
the doubts regarding the quality of the resulting steel persisted. The general opinion was 
that the OHF had prevailed for many years and they were continued to be built. However, 
the Japanese made improvements, increasing the performance of the firebricks, reducing 
pollution and applying computerised control systems. The BOFs became widespread after 
the second half of the 1960s.23
In countries with established steel industries, the first companies to adopt the BOF were 
not sector leaders. This was the case of the Canadian company, Dofasco and the American 
company, McLouth. They became interested in the new converter due to the scarcity of 
scrap in the whole of North America and the increase in demand after 1950. They made 
several attempts, they visited Austria in 1953 (the Japanese went in 1951), and in 1954 they 
constructed the prototype plant. They did not have OHF converters and therefore there was 
no need to wait to receive a return on their investments and there was no internal resistance 
to overcome. In both cases, the initial problem that they had to resolve was the scrap issue.24
In short, the pioneer idea of this small producer, Kawasaki, which either had to innovate 
or die given the difficult post-war circumstances, was successful and was quickly adopted 
by the rest of the steel producers with the support of the Japanese government once its 
initial resistance had been overcome. There was an explosive domestic demand behind the 
boom in the Japanese steel sector. The need to obtain currency to import basic goods and 
materials transformed steel into a product aimed at both the domestic market (the rice of 
industry) and foreign markets. Furthermore, the shortage of scrap led Japanese companies to 
search for technological alternatives to the OHF and they found it in the new BOF converter 
that was being developed in Austria. Between 1957 and 1962, all the large Japanese steel 
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companies adopted the BOF following their transfer to the coast.25 Consequently, these two 
innovations played a significant role in converting the Japanese steel industry into the most 
competitive in the world.
2. Europe’s concern and the independence of Japanese industry
In order to understand Europe’s initial reaction to the Japanese challenge in world steel mar-
kets and the attitude of its main players, we should examine the institutional situation of the 
continent. After the Schuman declaration of March 1950, and the signing of the Treaty of Paris 
in 1951, several countries had taken the steps necessary to create a customs union in the coal 
and steel sectors which was implemented on 23 July 1952 under the name of the ECSC. These 
countries were Germany, France, Italy, The Netherlands, Belgium and Luxembourg, while the 
UK decided not to join. The Treaty of Paris established the High Authority which was author-
ised to make decisions on a variety of aspects in both sectors, particularly those relating to 
investment, agreements between companies, mergers, acquisitions and foreign relations. 
However, from the outset, both the companies affected and the member countries were 
distrustful or even opposed to this new principle of supranationality, which in practice, carried 
the risk of undermining their power to make strategic decisions. The new High Authority of 
the ECSC, with the first president, Jean Monnet at the helm, took the functions assigned by 
the Treaty very seriously and carried them out with enthusiasm, although to do this it had to 
fight against the opposition of the governments and companies of the member countries. At 
least until 1967, when the ECSC were dissolved into the broader institutions of the European 
Economic Community, the High Authority played a key role in Europe’s response to the prob-
lems in the world steel market and in the internal measures to organise and rationalise the 
European steel market according to how the ECSC understood it. However, the real power 
of the High Authority to impose its decisions on the steel sector was severely limited due to 
the opposition of the governments and a highly cartelised industry. Furthermore, it had no 
influence over the British steel sector, the largest in Europe after the Second World War, which 
had not participated in the foundation agreement and did not join the EEC  until 1973.26
Until the 1970s, the Europeans did not seriously fear the influx of Japanese products that 
was taking place in the US.27 However, already in the 1960s, the authorities of the Community 
were highly aware of the growing threat that Japan represented for the continent’s steel 
industry. According to an internal report issued in 1963, the Community was concerned 
about its exports, which fell from 13.7 million tonnes in 1961 to 12.4 million in 1962. The 
fall in export earnings led to a fall in investments and the subsequent risk of losing compet-
itiveness. The Japanese producers forced this reduction in European exports by lowering 
prices, seriously weakening ’the traditional positions of the Community in Asian countries 
and South American regions.’28 As well as transferring to the coast, the implementation of 
the BOF freed them from their dependence on scrap imports necessary for the OHFs.29 Three 
years later, an independent study also concluded that a tonne of BOF steel cost between 58.5 
and 67 dollars as opposed to 84.5–91 for a tonne of OHF steel. In other words, it represented 
a saving of 30%.30 Also in 1966, in a secret report written by F. Peco for the High Authority 
after a trip to Asia, the representative of the ECSC concluded that Japan was closing the gap 
with Europe in terms of relations with the Far East and that the Vietnam War constituted an 
opportunity for the development of the Japanese steel industry.31 A German report issued 
in 1970 also came to the same conclusion.32
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The evolution in the trade of steel between Japan and Europe was an issue that was 
among the competences assigned by the Treaty of Paris to the High Authority. As could be 
expected, the High Authority representatives were intrigued by Japan’s boom in the steel 
markets and requested a meeting with the Japanese authorities in 1963. A delegation from 
the ECSC led by the managing director of steel, Tony Rollman, and the director of foreign 
affairs, Charles Reichling, travelled to Tokyo between the 30 May and 1 June. After meeting 
with the authorities they visited the Kawasaki facilities in Chiba. Later, Tony Rollman wrote, 
’I was very much impressed with what I saw’.33 In their interview with the Japanese gov-
ernment and sector leaders, the Europeans expressed their concern because some of the 
steel products exported to the ECSC countries (especially coils) were cheaper than those 
produced in Europe. They informed them of their suspicion that Japan was engaged in 
dumping practices and threatened to impose the safeguard clause, but first they wanted to 
talk to the Japanese to try to find another solution. The Europeans expressed their desire to 
’avoid useless confusion in the market and to establish and efficient system that would allow 
orderly export and import of steel products’, and offered a pact similar to the agreement that 
they had signed with Austria. The Japanese denied any dumping activity and explained that 
steel-making costs had reduced dramatically in recent years. At first they seemed open to 
the idea of an agreement in the market and the Europeans believed they had the intention 
to agree to it. However, the Japanese government backed down, saying that it did not have 
the resources to impose any kind of industrial agreement.34
The steel market recovered during 1964, but the ECSC authorities were concerned by 
the excess capacity of the sector (aggravated by further plans to increase the capacity in 
many countries around the world) and did not abandon their quest to reach an agreement 
with Japan that would help avert future crises. The next relevant contact between the two 
parties occurred during the celebration of the 50th Anniversary of the Iron and Steel Institute 
of Japan held in Tokyo in the spring of 1965. In his speech on behalf of the ECSC, Charles 
Reichling underlined the need to reach some type of agreement with Japan similar to the 
one signed with Austria to which the UK had also joined (its main suppliers of steel prod-
ucts from abroad), based on the exchange of information, consultations regarding price 
agreements and everything related to the trade of steel. In the event of a crisis (slump in 
demand or shortage), the collaboration would ensure that trade restrictions were not intro-
duced without prior consultation of the other part and would ’stabilise the market’. Reichling 
believed that Japan and the ECSC, as the world’s leading exporters of steel products, should 
be equally interested in avoiding the dangers surrounding the sector due to the overcapacity 
and therefore he considered it best for both parties to ’establish a basis of co-operation with 
a view to bringing the world steel market on to a more even keel’.35
But they were not all in agreement. In a secret report taken by Reichling to the High 
Authority, the ECSC envoy wrote that there was a clear disagreement between the opinion 
of the Japanese government and the steel industry with respect to the issue of the price 
and production agreement. The large Japanese steel-makers did not want to be tied to 
agreements at the height of their export growth. However a majority opinion in the Japanese 
government claimed that the agreement could be a way of avoiding the opposition from 
importing countries, in this case the members of the ECSC. The Japanese Vice-Minister of 
Foreign Affairs had confidentially informed them that his government was in favour of 
signing a treaty similar to the pact with Austria and the UK, but beforehand, the two most 
influential figures of the Japanese steel sector had to be persuaded: Nagano, President of 
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the Federation of Producers (and of Fuji Steel), and Inayama, president of the Association of 
Exporters (and of yawata Steel). Only in this way could the MITI accept this proposal. When 
the Europeans met with the ministries of Foreign Affairs, MITI and Finance, the dominant 
theme was the need for a better organisation of the world market: ’The Foreign Affairs point 
of view can be summarised in one word: convince the industry and this will convince the 
MITI and Foreign Affairs is already ready to enter into an agreement with the ECSC’.36
According to a confidential note from the foreign relations department in 1965, due to 
the difficulties that Japan had caused the ECSC during the last crisis in its foreign markets 
(although also in its domestic market, particularly with coils), the objective of the High 
Authority was to gather as much information as possible on the Japanese steel industry 
and establish a permanent relationship with Japan in order to implement and coordi-
nate fast measures if necessary. Japan’s intentions were completely unknown due to the 
country’s impenetrability. The economic information written in Western languages was 
scarce and superficial. If the High Authority wished to obtain a complete picture it needed 
direct contact with representatives from the Japanese government, with an exchange of 
information based on reciprocity. On the other hand, Japan was interested in shaking off 
its reputation for dumping and incorrect practices in world trade and this is why Europe 
believed that Japan would willingly accept a commission that would address conflictive 
issues behind closed doors. Although it rejected the proposal to sign a price agreement 
similar to the one signed with Austria and the UK a mutual consultation agreement would 
be favoured by Japan which sought to improve its image in the world in the light of the 
growth of its trade.37
In fact, Japan rejected the price agreement alluding to the safeguarding clause defended 
by France and the Benelux, although the real reason resided in the logical growth expec-
tations of its leading steel companies thanks to its undeniable competitiveness which had 
been witnessed by the European representatives. Neither these representatives nor the 
Japanese government were able to convince the Japanese steel industry of the virtues of 
an agreement that would restrict its capacity to expand in the future. As pointed out by 
O’Brien, in the 1960s, the capacity of the MITI to influence the decision of companies was 
weakening because they no longer needed to recur to government bodies for the capital 
required for their investments as they were able to obtain it in the market thanks to their 
earning capacity.38 In other words, the political objectives of the government did not always 
prevail over those of the economic sectors. Due to this relative independence, the final 
result of the negotiations between the High Authority and the Japanese government was 
meagre in content as it was limited to establishing biannual informative meetings. A mixed 
Commission was created for exchanging points of view on the steel industry composed of 
five experts from each party. This commission collected data and opinions on the evolution 
of the world market, the raw materials and technical innovations. The Japanese distrust dis-
solved when they saw that the Europeans had abandoned their most ambitious objectives. 
At least six meetings were held between September 1965 and April 1968, the year in which 
the functions of the ECSC were absorbed by the EEC.39 In short, the official objective of the 
meetings was the exchange of information regarding techniques, products and markets. But 
the hidden objective of the Europeans (according to the documents in the ECSC archive), 
was to attempt to reach agreements regarding price controls and the sharing of interna-
tional markets. From the outset, the Japanese were uneasy about the Europeans’ attempts 
to go further and were only appeased once they saw that the Europeans had given up their 
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ambitions. Finally, the real content of the conversations corresponded to the initial official 
objective as requested by the Japanese.
In addition to the accusations and contact with the Japanese authorities, the European 
business world and politicians soon realised the need to travel to Japan to see at first hand the 
reasons for the success of its steel industry. The celebration of the 50th anniversary of the Iron 
and Steel Institute of Japan in the spring of 1965 was the moment when a change occurred 
in the objectives of these trips. Two qualified experts sent by the ECSC in the summer of 
the same year who visited 10 coastal steelworks were initially surprised by the confidence 
that the top Japanese executives transmitted with respect to their future (they interviewed 
57 presidents and general managers), but after visiting the factories they understood this 
assurance.40 Obviously, this foreign interest did not go unnoticed by the Japanese. Yawata 
News, the official journal of yawata Iron & Steel, referred to it, remembering that until 1964 
the foreign experts visited Japan to control sales and install Western equipment, but after 
1965 the purpose of their trips changed: ’For as the Japanese steel industry reached top world 
technological levels through its own research, here began a series of visits of inspection, to 
study Japanese iron and steel-making methods’.41
We have a list of the foreign visitors to the facilities of yawata in 1966 and 1967. In total, 
1101 people visited different Japanese steelworks in 1966 (248 more than the previous year), 
of which 320 (124 more) came from Europe: including Klöckner and Thyssen from Germany, 
Sollac and Sidelor from France, Italsider from Italy, several British companies, Sidmar from 
Belgium, a Swiss delegation and the Chambre Syndical de la Siderurgie Française. The major-
ity of them represented companies, but authorities from the OECD and ECSC also went. In 
1967 the trips continued: 1548 visitors (447 more than in 1966), of which 433 came from 
Europe, including Uninsa from Spain, Sollac and Usinor from France, Krupp from Germany and 
Stewards & Loyds from Britain, as well as other representatives from Britain and Euratom.42 
This boom in trips to Japan to learn about the development of the innovations preceded 
their adoption in European countries during the following decade.
3. The adoption of the major innovations in Europe
In the second half of the 1960s, the majority of the directors of steelworks in Europe knew 
why Japan had been able to drastically reduce its relative production costs and therefore 
grow in international steel markets at the cost of other producers including the traditional 
European steel sector. In a secret note sent to the members of the High Authority in 1966, 
the Directorate General of Economy and Energy of the ECSC acknowledged that the fall-
ing prices of steel in the markets of third countries represented a critical situation for the 
Community’s steel industry. According to the report, the new production techniques con-
stituted a revolutionary phenomenon that had never arisen in this way and had altered ’the 
normal competitive game’.43 They also knew what these techniques were and were aware of 
the main innovations in the production process of the integrated steel industry and for some 
time had been focusing on transferring factories to the coast and the new BOF together with 
the improvements and enlargements of the blast furnaces and other innovations.
However, knowing the causes of the problems of the European steel industry’s com-
petitiveness with respect to Japan was very different to facing the consequences of the 
decisions that had to be taken to resolve them. In the 1960s, the European steel sector 
had inherited the post-war situation. The majority of traditional steel-making regions were 
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concentrated in a strip which, from north to south, covered the Walloon region of Belgium 
and the north of France, Luxembourg, the Lorraine region of France and the German state 
of Saarland, as well as the Ruhr valley, in line with the historical logic of the proximity of iron 
ore or coal in the same way as the British steel-making regions. Therefore, Europe’s situation 
was the opposite of Japan’s: a steel sector tied to the old deposits of raw materials. Since 
the mid 1950s, it had invested a large amount of money in improving the efficiency of its 
plants through renovating equipment and building new infrastructures. In the middle of the 
following decade, the Rhine was able to allow large vessels to ship cheap and high quality 
iron ore to Ruhr, and the new Moselle canal was used to transport iron ore from Sweden, 
Africa and Brazil to the producing areas of France and Luxembourg which until then had 
depended on low quality local iron ore. Although not to such a high degree as Japan, the 
renovation of the blast furnaces had reduced the need for coal.44 Japan’s investment in the 
steel industry was equal to that of the USA and the EEC between 1956 and 1976 but with 
very different results: Japan had used this investment to increase its production with its new 
coastal steelworks, the USA to maintain its production by renovating its existing industry 
and Europe was somewhere in between, investing in both the renovation of existing plants 
and the creation of new ones.45
The Japanese case became an example for the whole world with regards the effec-
tiveness of certain innovations to increase productivity, reduce unit costs, lower prices 
and gain market share. The European steel industry (companies, governments and the 
ECSC) was convinced that it needed to implement the innovations following Japan’s lead. 
Significantly, The Netherlands, a country without a steel-making tradition due to its lack of 
mining resources, had become a new player in the integrated steel sector thanks to its cre-
ation of the new coastal greenfield of Ijmuiden, close to Amsterdam, through the company 
Hoogovens. Founded in 1918 with private capital and state subsidies, its location near deep 
water and good transport conditions made it possible in the 1930s to become the world’s 
biggest exporter of pig iron. Subsequently, it expanded its production capacity as of 1950 
by applying the public–private collaboration model.46 At the end of the 1950s, Italy began 
to implement an ambitious plan of investing public money through the company Finsider 
with the aim of becoming a leading European steel-maker, comparable with France and 
Germany, two of the ECSC’s heavyweights, when this company was founded. In the 1960s, 
it created two integrated plants in Cornigliano and Taranto (to add to those already existing 
in Bagnoli and Piombino), and after 1971 its plans focused on increasing the production 
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Figure 2. Japan vs. europe. Adoption of the BoF, 1955–1980 (% of total crude steel). sources: Adams and 
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capacity of the steelcoast of Taranto to 10 million tonnes which it achieved in 1975, and to 
create a coastal greenfield in Naples to replace the old plants of Bagnoli and Cornigliano. 
This project was indefinitely suspended due to the crisis of the second half of the decade.47
Belgium and Luxembourg, two small countries with a high industrial specialisation within 
the steel sector also tried to adapt to the new paradigm. In 1962, they created Sidmar in 
Zelzate, near Ghent, with easy access to the sea. In 1966, it began to produce flat steel. The 
Luxembourg company Arbed gradually acquired shares in Sidmar until it controlled 84% of 
its capital in 1975. Meanwhile, the factories located inland fell into decline and successive 
restructuring programmes were implemented due to an accumulation of losses. As in other 
countries, the attempts by the State to avoid the definitive closure of the plants led to their 
nationalisation in the beginning of the 1980s.48 Arbed, on the other hand, combined its 
strategy to control the coastal plant of Sidmar with the establishment of new operations in 
the German steel sector. This country chose a different strategy to its neighbours.
Although the operating cost advantage of coastal steelworks is undeniable, the fact that 
steelworks already existed made it a difficult decision to make. The coastal plants were ideal 
for Japan and the Netherlands as these countries did not have any existing steelworks and 
no raw materials. However, there was also a strong argument for locating the factories close 
to the mines provided that the deposits could be exploited on a large scale. In the case of 
Germany, there was cheap transport, an outlet to the sea, geographical opportunities for 
expansion and proximity to clients. The large German companies, such as Krupp, Hoesch, 
Thyssen and Mannesmann opted for a strategy of vertical integration which enabled them to 
offer consumer products to the market, and to do this they invested capital in their facilities 
seeking to modernise and rationalise them without the need to transfer them to the coast. 
All of the above-mentioned elements could improve the competitiveness of a European steel 
factory in a traditional location. Although the Japanese saving was sufficiently large as to 
compete advantageously with the old European factories beside the mines, this did not mean 
that in all cases the latter had to close down. The factories located on the banks of the Rhine 
were in a position to receive raw materials from the rest of the world and integrate with the 
powerful German car and electrical appliance industries. In 1979, seven large groups, four of 
which were located on the Rhine in the region of Duisburg, Essen and Dortmund, produced 
94% of German crude steel amounting to 46 million tonnes.49 The survival of the Ruhr steel 
companies constituted an exception in the European panorama and not even other German 
regions with a long tradition of steel-making, such as the Sarlaand, could imitate it. This 
exception was possible thanks to three factors: the supply of foreign iron ore thanks to the 
access to the sea via the Rhine, the closeness to the final customers (manufacturers of cars 
and electrical material) and the large scale of the coal deposits. These three factors together 
were not present in any other European region.
In general terms, the European steel industry was faced with the same problem as the 
US. The new facilities that had to be built to imitate the Japanese model required a large 
investment of capital which the private shareholders were not willing to provide due to the 
low estimated return. The underlying reason for the enormous growth of the Japanese steel 
industry was the increase in its domestic demand driven by its rapid industrialisation.50 Both 
the European and US markets were mature compared to the Japanese market that was expe-
riencing explosive growth. Furthermore, the transformation of the European steel sector and 
its transfer to the coast was mostly carried out with public investment or an extension of state 
subsidies during the 1970s.51 This was the case of France and the UK. France built two coastal 
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steelworks: one in the north in Dunkirk, through the private company Usinor, which in 1970 
decided to increase its capacity from 3.6 million tonnes of steel to 8 million; and another in 
the south, the Fos-sur-Mer plant in Marseille, through the holding company Solmer and with 
a third of the investment derived from public funds.52 In Britain, the large capital investments 
in the steel industry had to wait until the 1970s after the first investment effort in 1960–1962. 
When the British steel sector was nationalised in 1967, 21 integrated plants became part of the 
British Steel Corporation, together with 200 or subsidiary factories. Between 1970 and 1980 
the Japanese model of coastal steelworks was implemented with a production capacity of 
between three and six million tonnes and most of the investment was used to modernise and 
expand five large steel plants: Port Talbot, Llanwern, Scunthorpe, Lackenby and Ravenscraig.53
In the second half of the 1970s, with a deepening economic crisis, the protests against 
the invasion of Japanese products extended throughout Europe. Steel represented 10% of 
Japanese exports to the EEC and in Germany and other member countries the accusations 
of dumping and non-tariff barriers intensified. There was a temptation to restrict the entry 
of Japanese steel, and a boycott was called for. After 1977 antidumping measures were 
applied in Britain against the steel imported from Japan. Meanwhile, Commissioner Davignon 
announced that the European steel industry was to undergo a profound transformation 
and that in the process it did not wish to be hindered by Japanese competition in its own 
territory.54 The protection granted was intended to support investments in long-term coastal 
projects and deter other projects of questionable feasibility. The onset of a new economic 
crisis in 1980 required a greater injection of public capital and reductions in production 
capacities throughout the whole continent. In France, the state transformed the loans to 
the steel companies into capital so that it became the owner of the companies. It finally 
understood that it had to sacrifice the traditional steel industry of the Lorraine and commit 
almost exclusively to the coastal plant of Dunkirk while the second phase of the Marseille 
plant was postponed until more favourable times.55 In Britain, the structural crisis of the 
sector after 1976 caused the initial ambitious objectives of the first half of the decade to be 
moderated. The new crisis that arose in 1980 reduced even further the demand expectations 
and the future steel investment and production plans. But throughout the crisis the strategy 
to close the old production centres and reinforce new coastal factories was supported.56
The adoption of the BOF within the European integrated steel industry was directly influ-
enced by the specific moment when the investment decisions were made with regard to 
the new coastal steel industry in each country. In the first half of the 1960s, the majority of 
the countries that constructed the new steelworks opted for conventional, albeit improved, 
systems that used Thomas and open hearth processes. The Thomas process was faster than 
the OHF but the latter was superior in terms of quality and flexibility which made it ideal 
for ship plate. All the doubts related to the superiority of the new converters had still not 
been dispelled and as the price of scrap in Europe was moderate there was no incentive to 
look for alternatives. In the second half of the 1960s the problems relating to the quality of 
the product made with the BOF were resolved. The superiority of the BOF over Thomas and 
OHF became apparent, due to its lower operating costs and on the whole the new greenfield 
projects adopted the new converters.57 As we can observe in Figure 2, Europe experienced 
a process of technological convergence and at the end of the 1970s had matched Japan 
in terms of the percentage of output produced with the BOF system, around 75% of total 
crude steel production. This was just after Japan’s percentage had begun to decline, after 
peaking in 1975, due to the increasing use of electric furnaces.
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Bearing these factors in mind, the Italian integrated steel industry opted for OHFs in its 
investment plans at the end of the 1950s and beginning of the 1960s. In 1964 only 2.4% of its 
steel was produced with the BOF method as opposed to 49.9% with the open hearth system 
and 43.2% with electric furnaces (thanks to non-integrated companies called Bresciani). In 
Belgium and Luxembourg, the percentage was also very small: 6.8% in 1964 which was not 
corrected until the 1970s when the old Thomas converters were replaced. The percentage of 
production produced with the BOF system in France and Britain was also low, although not 
as low as the afore-mentioned countries: 11.4% and 10.5% respectively in 1964 and 18% and 
24% in 1968. The Dutch company Hoogovens was the exception: from the outset, between 
1955 and 1958, it adopted the BOF process in its new plant in Ijmuiden, which was imple-
mented alongside the OHF.58 In 1964 it was the ECSC country with the highest percentage 
of steel produced with the new system: 70%. The advances made in Germany’s restructuring 
process were evident in its adoption of BOF in the 1960s: the percentage of steel produced 
with the new converters grew from 14% in 1964 to 37% in 1968, but it was still much lower 
than in Japan.59 In the 1970s, France adopted the new system in its coastal plants in Dunkirk 
and Marseille, and in Britain the adoption of the new converters was extended through the 
modernisation and rationalisation programmes of the British Steel Corporation. In 1970 it 
produced a third of its total crude steel output with this system and by 1980 it was producing 
59% (below the European average) with the new converters in the modern steelworks at 
Ravenscraig, Port Talbot and Lackenby.60 In short, the delay suffered by Europe with respect 
to Japan in adopting the new converter was corrected with the abundant input of public 
capital in a period of between 10 and 20 years in the majority of the countries except the 
Netherlands and Germany. The technological gap that had opened in the 1960s closed at 
the end of the 1970s.
With respect to the late adoption of the BOF in Europe it is worth making a final comment 
about the role played by the ECSC. Since its foundation, the steel and coal industries were 
sectors subject to intervention: the decisions remained in the hands of the companies but 
some of them had to be approved by the High Authority, especially those concerning invest-
ment and alliances. Many of the latter, those relating to market share, were not approved in 
an attempt by the ECSC to avoid concentration in the belief that maximum competition in 
the sector was beneficial to offer steel consumers the best prices. Multi-level decision-making 
was applied to innovation: companies, governments (who provided support and subsidies) 
and European institutions were all involved. At least until 1967, when the functions of the 
High Authority were integrated into the EEC institutions, and as a consequence of the prin-
ciple of supranationality established in the Treaty of Paris, the ECSC intervened in the scrap 
market in different ways. First, it banned the export of scrap to third countries (in the UK 
a similar decision was made61); second, it established maximum prices; third, in response 
to the shortage of scrap due to the steel boom of 1954, the High Authority approved a 
compensatory mechanism in July 1955 whereby the imported scrap would be sold to the 
steel-making companies at the same price as domestic scrap, subject to maximum prices. 
In this way, scrap became a subsidised input. Furthermore, the High Authority exercised its 
supranational authority on several occasions, such as when it stopped a manoeuvre by the 
French Government in 1955 which entailed French scrap merchants committing to the steel 
companies in their country to guarantee their supply before exporting to other countries 
of the ECSC. This commitment prevented the free movement of steel products within the 
ECSC and would have led to the restriction of the supply of scrap in the community.62 These 
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measures adopted by the ECSC were relatively successful and contributed to maintaining 
scrap at affordable prices in Europe.63
Achieving this objective was important so that the ECSC could justify its usefulness to the 
steel sector and the appropriateness of the consultation policy, as scrap was a fundamental 
raw material in the open hearth process and the companies needed to keep its cost under 
control. But we should remember that one of the reasons for the fast adoption of the BOF 
in Japan was the high price of scrap in that country. Until 1957, the price of scrap in Japan 
was higher than $70 per tonne ($84 in 1958) while the decisions made by the ECSC ensured 
that it did not exceed $50. In the following years until the mid 1960s, the price of scrap in 
Japan was always between 25% and 50% higher than the price of scrap in Europe.64 It was 
the search for alternatives to scrap that led the Japanese steel business leaders to travel to 
Austria at the beginning of the 1950s and to resolve the problems of the new converter in 
the subsequent years. In the wake of these events, the actions of the ECSC may seem con-
tradictory: seeing that its policy to keep the price of scrap low had been relatively successful, 
the High Authority delayed the introduction of the BOF in Europe.65 Although the price of 
scrap was not the only factor to be taken into account when adopting the new converter it 
was one of the most important. With less pressure with respect to the price of scrap, there 
was no urgency to change the system that had until then clearly proved to be superior. In the 
1960s, the decision of European companies to maintain the OHF was rational. As Lynn points 
out (1982, p. 116), ’the later the adoption, the lower the uncertainty, and the lower the costs 
of development’. As this article makes clear postponing this decision not only resulted in 
lower uncertainty and costs, but also in a lower competitiveness of the companies involved.
4. Conclusion
According to Barnett and Schorsch, ’between 1960 and 1975, the Japanese revolutionised 
the perception of the world steel market in terms of economies of scale. All the pieces of the 
productivity puzzle seemed to fit together in Japan between 1959 and 1972’.66 The following 
elements came into play: foreign imposition of opening the economy to the outside together 
with the shortage of raw materials which obliged them to import; sustained growth of domestic 
demand for steel; high price of scrap which led them to finding alternatives to the open hearth 
converters; loss of protection of vested interests (in steel) or absence of them (coal); and the 
existence of a qualified workforce with motivated leaders. The business factor has also been 
highlighted by some authors (particularly yonekura, 1994), as well as the independence of the 
decisions of the sector with respect to the Japanese government guidelines from the 1960s. The 
documents that we have consulted corroborate this independence of the sector with respect 
to the MITI that was incapable of curbing the expansionist ambitions of its business leaders.
Paraphrasing Barnett and Schorsch, we could say that, on the contrary to what happened 
in Japan, the pieces of the productivity puzzle did not fit together in Europe between 1950 
and 1980, at least not entirely. The European delay with respect to Japan and the relative 
loss of competitiveness in the integrated steel industry was not due to a lack of investment 
or the absence of an entrepreneurial spirit, but to an institutional, geographical and eco-
nomic logic based largely on historical factors. First, Europe had a long steel-making history 
that was closely related to its sources of raw materials. The new technological paradigm 
turned this former advantage into a clear disadvantage. In those countries that did not have 
their own natural resources, such as the Netherlands and Italy, the integrated steel industry 
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could be located on the coast (from the 1930s in the Netherlands) in a much shorter period 
of time and did not have to face the resistance encountered by the traditional regions in 
Belgium, Luxembourg, Germany, France and the UK. Second, the large investments made 
in the Thomas and open hearth processes and the affordable price of scrap delayed the 
adoption of the BOF until its superiority had been clearly demonstrated. The new system of 
producing steel followed the installation of the new coastal steelworks which were supported 
by a considerable amount of public capital due to the withdrawal of private interests given 
the enormous capital needs of the new plants and the low expected return.
As the documentation consulted reveals, the European authorities reacted to the Japanese 
threat by protesting against the fall in steel prices, accusing Japan of dumping practices and 
even threatening to restrict imports. When they were unable to achieve price agreements 
with Japan, they focused on getting closer to the Japanese leaders to learn more about 
the new industrial phenomenon, establishing relations, making study trips and exchang-
ing very useful information to prepare for the inevitable technological adaptation. But the 
results of the ECSC’s actions with respect to the European integrated steel industry remain 
inconclusive due to the possible negative influence of its decisions on the sector’s capacity 
of technological adaptation. After its partial success in maintaining the prices of scrap stable 
(although volatile), the High Authority contributed to delaying the adoption of the new and 
more productive BOF. This late European adaptation with respect to Japan in the phase of 
converting pig iron into steel opened a technological gap that could only be closed one and 
a half decades later thanks to the generous injection of public money.
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